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Walter (2013) argues in that a bunch
of externalist approaches examined in
the theory of mind is interesting for
psychiatry—especially for biological psy-
chiatry. The externalist approaches state
that mental states are not only consti-
tuted by internal but also by external
factors. He subsumes them under the
so-called 4E-thesis: embodied, embedded,
extended, enacted. His example is con-
cerned with ADHD such that ADHD is
only existent “in an environment that
favors attentional distraction and punishes
hyperactivity.”
First, using the 4E-thesis seems to
be explanatorily attractive: There are
factors of the disorder that can be
grouped as external constituents and
these constituents are not named by
internalist vocabulary. For example, pun-
ishment is for sure not part of internalist
vocabulary.
But there is a figure of a principal argu-
ment against using the 4E-thesis in psychi-
atry. Consider this cookbook theory of the
4E-thesis:
Cookbook theory for the 4E-thesis in
accord with Henrik Walter’s multilevel-
approach:
1. There is the phenomenon of a psychi-
atric disorder instanced in the form of
multilevel-complexes.
2. There are embodied, embedded,
extended, or enacted (4E) constituents
of cognition that realize the cognitive
systems.
3. There are individuation criteria for the
4E-constituents.
4. Coupled systems of individuated 4E-
constituents individuate a multilevel-
complex.
5. There are individuation criteria for
systems of constituents C that realize
multilevel-complexes.
For example, with respect to extended
cognition, the cookbook theory is the
following:
Cookbooktheoryofextendedcognition:
1. There is the phenomenon of cognition
of a group of patients in psychia-
try instanced in the form of cognitive
systems of a specific structure.
2. There are vehicles of cognition that
realize the cognitive systems named
in 1.
3. There are individuation criteria for
vehicles named in 2.
4. Coupled systems of individuated vehi-
cles individuate a cognitive system.
5. There are individuation criteria for sys-
tems of vehicles of cognition that realize
cognitive systems named in 1.
As one can see, every attempt of the
4E-thesis needs criteria marking where
to stop adding externalist constituents to
the constituent base of the psychiatric
disorder. For example, extended cognition-
constituents should not include the whole
world to make the thesis an interesting
thesis—otherwise every phenomenon to
be explained by extended cognition is con-
stituted by the same constituents (i.e., the
whole world). But what kind of criterion
can the 4E-externalist provide us with?
First, the 4E-externalist could give a
criterion based on intrinsic properties of
systemsrealizingdisorders.Butasadetailed
analysisofcriteriaof thiskindbyAdamsand
Aizawa (2001, 2010) shows, these criteria
are regularly based on finding amark of the
cognitive—which seems to be a hopeless
endeavor without being a fundamentalist
who just adds axiomatically this criterion
to the cookbook theory.
But second, the 4E-externalist could
maybe give a criterion based on extrinsic
properties of systems realizing psychiatric
disorders. For example, one could use reli-
ability as a stop-criterion for delineating
what is coupled (with respect to point 4
in the cookbook theories). What is reliably
coupled builds a constituent base of a sys-
tem realizing a psychiatric disorder. But as
a detailed analysis shows, this is not the case
(Bukow and Will, in press). With respect
to different criteria of reliability, there are
very different reliable systems. This is not
trivial, because in accord with the cook-
book theory-approach, Bukow and Will
argue:
Argument for the arbitrariness of the
reliability-predicate:
1. Assume the cookbook theory of
extended cognition.
2. Give a definition of reliability with an
operationalization (e.g., reproducibility
as an operationalization).
3. Choose an experimental procedure to
test for reliability based on interaction
between systems (because reliability is
relative to this experimental procedure).
4. Choose a value X%, i.e., that the experi-
mental procedure is reproducible inX%
of all series of experiments.
There is no established decision proce-
dure for the needed choices in points
3 and 4. And whatever procedure you
choose, youmay get different values forX%
which will lead the psychiatrist to different
constituentbasesof thepsychiatricdisorder
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to be explained. Bukow andWill analyze in
detail other candidates for criteria based on
extrinsicproperties, for example functional
roles, causal roles, or heuristics.
Now, there are two horns for the
4E-externalist:
Horn 1: Use a stop-criterion based
on intrinsic properties. The critics of
Adam and Aizawa bite the propo-
nent of this kind of criterion. If you
add the criterion axiomatically, then
you are a fundamentalist and not a
scientist.
Horn 2: Use a stop-criterion based on
extrinsic properties. Then, there is the
need to show in detail how to use such
a criterion—which seems to be hope-
less in accord with the investigation
above. If you add the criterion with-
out detailed analysis, then you are using
just so-stories, without guarantee that
the criterion fulfills its job.
For these reasons, using the 4E-thesis
is tempting but dangerous—there is no
well-founded stop-criterion in philosophy
of mind that a psychiatrist could use—not
in a detailed way and not in a rough way.
It is arbitrary what type and what token
the psychiatrist may use with respect to the
selection of constituents of a disorder. In
a principal debate, the 4E-proponent may
excuse these deficits because nobody may
give in principal such stop-criteria. But in
psychiatry, principal deficits are no excuse
for misuse. Arbitrariness can smooth the
way for use—but also for misuse in psychi-
atry,which is a dangerous zonewith respect
to rights and needs of patients of psychi-
atry. And if a psychiatrist can only give
arbitrary constituent bases to a patient’s
disorder, then disorder and treatment will
only arbitrarily be defined. This is, as far
as I can see, an objection against Henrik
Walter’sargumentforamature“thirdwave”
biological psychiatry.
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